L. A. Guardiola Alcalá, A. Meca, J. Puerto

The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains play an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized control in which noncompeting retailers can order from multiple suppliers to replenish their stocks. Suppliers' production capacity is bounded. The goal of the firms is to maximize their individual profits. As the outcome under decentralized control is inefficient, coordination of actions between agents can improve individual profits. Cooperative game theory is used to analyze cooperation between agents. We define multi-retailer-supplier games and show that agents can always achieve together an optimal profit and they have incentives to cooperate and to form the grand coalition. Moreover, we show that there always exist stable allocations of the total profit which no coalition can improve. We propose and characterize a stable allocation of the total surplus induced by cooperation.

Palabras clave: decentralized distribution chains, multiple suppliers, cooperation, stable allocations

Programado

GT19.GAMES3. Game Theory Working Group: Session II in honor of Prof. Stef Tijs
9 de noviembre de 2023  15:30
CC2: Sala Conferencias


Otros trabajos en la misma sesión

On priority in multi-issue bankruptcy problems with crossed claims

R. Acosta Vega, E. Algaba, J. SANCHEZ SORIANO

On the average-of-awards rule for solving claims problems

I. Núñez Lugilde, E. Sánchez Rodríguez

Shapley value-based rules for distributing delay costs in stochastic projects

J. M. Alonso-Meijide, J. Costa, I. García Jurado, J. C. Gonçalves Dosantos


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