W. Thomson
Replicating economies is a common technique to model situations in which no one agent has a significant impact on equilibrium variables. The requirement of invariance under replication has also been invoked on normative grounds. We propose to strengthen it by allowing the orders of replication to be agent dependent. For classical economies and when imposed together with standard and mild axioms, it is shown to imply that only competitive allocations can be chosen. For the problem of allocating a single good among a group of people with single-peaked preferences, it can play a critical role in the characterization of the so-called uniform rule. For object allocation problems when lotteries are allowed, a characterization of one of the two most prominent rules can also be derived in which it is oe of the critical requirements
Keywords: Allocation problems, Walrasian rule, Uniform rule
Scheduled
GT19.GAMES1. Invited session. Game Theory Working Group: Keynote Session
November 9, 2023 11:40 AM
CC2: Conference Room